An important limitation on the breadth of the sovereign immunity doctrine is illustrated in the case of Champagne-Webber, Inc. and Miles Anderson Contracting, Inc.v. The City of Ft. Lauderdale, a Municipal Corporation, 519 So. 2^nd 696 (1988), where the contractor appealed a lower court’s grant of summary judgment that had resulted in the dismissal of the contractor’s action based on an overly broad application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The case arises out of the construction of a bridge for the City of Ft. Lauderdale (“the City”) in Florida.  Champagne-Webber, Inc. and Miles Anderson Contracting Inc. (“Champagne”) was the successful low bidder for the bridge construction project.  Champagne had prepared its bid relying on the City’s representation that the soil to be encountered at the site was sand.  Upon commencement of construction, however, the Contractor discovered the soil to be both sand and rock which required alternative and more expensive construction techniques.  Unlike most contracts with federal, state, and municipal entities, the contract did not contain a differing site condition clause that would have allowed an equitable adjustment in the contract price in the event conditions actually encountered at the site differed from those indicated.
 
Upon completion of the project, Champagne filed a three count complaint against the City to recover its excess costs associated with the encountered rock.  Count I was for breach of contract wherein Champagne alleged the City had breached is implied covenants by hindering and delaying the work because of the inaccurate and misleading information concerning soil conditions that were express covenants of the contract.  Count II was for breach of both express and implied warranties wherein Champagne alleged that the City had expressly warranted that the soil condition at the site was sand and had impliedly warranted that the drawings and plans provided for the work accurately showed soil conditions at the site.  Count II was an action for recovery based on quantum meruit, an equitable doctrine holding that no one should be unjustly enriched by the labor or materials of another.  Quantum Meruit provides a measure of recovery to a plaintiff in the situations where no written contract is available but an implied contract can be construed.
 
The City successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that these three counts were all barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The City argued that while Florida Law specifically allowed suits against the State and Municipalities for their breaches of express contract, it had specifically prohibited actions for breaches of implied contracts.  The trial court appears to have misinterpreted the law with respect to sovereign immunity, holding that the City could only be held accountable for “express provisions” in the contract.  On appeal, Champagne argued that the lower court had confused implied contracts, for which the doctrine of sovereign immunity would operate to bar suits, with implied covenants to express contracts for which sovereign immunity was inapplicable.  The Court of Appeals discussed the difference between an implied contract and an implied covenant or an implied warranty.
 
Virtually every contract contains implied covenants and conditions.  For example, every contract includes an implied covenant that the parties will perform in good faith.  In construction, Contract Law states an owner has, (a) an implied obligation to not do anything to hinder or obstruct the performance by the other person, (b) an implied obligation not to knowingly delay unreasonably the contractor’s performance of duties assumed under the Contract and (c) an implied obligation to furnish information which would not mislead prospective bidders.
 
The Appeals Court turned first to the third count, the quantum meruit action, and pointed out that this was an equitable action available only to parties between whom an express contract did not exist.  The Court noted that in the situation before it, a written (express) contract did exist and thus, the lower court’s dismissal of this count was upheld.  The first and second counts, on the other hand, dealt with implied covenants to the express contract between the parties.  Specifically, the Court noted that if information was placed on the drawings, the City had impliedly warranted that that information would be accurate.  This implied warranty was entirely different from an implied provision as the lower court had apparently characterized it.  The issue of whether the City breached the implied warranty that the site soil conditions as depicted on the drawings was accurate when the actual conditions turned out to be rock and soil was a question of fact not eligible for disposition on summary judgment.  The Court also held that the inaccurate data provided the City served to hinder and delay Champagne’s work on the project, which represented a breach by the City of its implied covenant not to interfere with Champagne.
 
In remanding the case to the lower court for dispensation, the Appeals Court held that where a suit is brought on an express written Contract, the defense of sovereign immunity does not protect the State from action arising out of the breach of either an express or implied covenant or condition of that Contract.