Introduction
Until recently, the field of finance ignored human
irrationality. Economic theory presumed
that individuals had unbiased expectations and acted rationally to maximize
their future wealth.
[1]
But researchers who study financial decision-making have
discovered a number of consistent errors in the way people make investment
choices. Unbiased, rational
wealth-maximizers seem to exist largely in economists’ imaginations.
What are the consequences of our increasingly sophisticated
understanding of financial behavior for retirement investing and the plan
design process? Let’s begin with a discussion
of what behavioral finance entails. We
can then examine individual investment errors and how to avoid them through
appropriate plan design.
Behavioral Finance
Briefly, behavioral finance combines economics with
psychological insights about how people make decisions in order to shed light
on market behavior. Researchers have
successfully documented a number of circumstances in which investors don’t behave
as economic theory would predict.
Broadly speaking, the fault lies in what is known as “bounded
rationality.”
Bounded rationality has two components: 1) constraints on
time and information; and 2) limits to our ability to handle complexity. The real world includes all sorts of trade-offs
that affect decision-making. We may
generally try to optimize our choices, but we do so given limited time and
often imperfect information. As a
result, we often resort to rules of thumb and other mental shortcuts than can
lead to suboptimal outcomes.
[2]
Further, given complex decisions involving time horizons,
competing preferences and an abundance of information, we tend to make
systematic errors in judgment. It turns
out that humans in general are not particularly good at adequately compounding
into the future, or assessing the relative utility of gains today versus future
losses, or assigning the appropriate weight to losses.
Common Participant
Errors
Behavioral finance researchers
have catalogued a number of systematic errors that affect defined-contribution
investment. There is now considerable
evidence that plan participants as a whole don’t act to maximize their
financial self-interest when it comes to saving for retirement.
Let’s briefly examine some of the primary errors in
judgment:
Inadequate Savings
Even when people know that something is in their
self-interest, such as saving for retirement, they often find it difficult to act
accordingly.
[3] We often exhibit a lack of self-control when
attempting to forego present enjoyment for future gratification. Further, humans are prone to what’s known as
“hyperbolic discounting,” which means that we overemphasize immediate desires
and rewards at the expense of long-term needs.
People may know that they should save for the future, but things
consistently come up in the present that seem more pressing than future needs.
[4]
In fact, consumption levels closely track income levels
throughout people’s lives. We seem to
do best with “enforced savings,” such as the equity in our houses and pension
plan contributions.
[5] In terms of defined contribution plans,
aggregate savings rates are abysmal.
Twenty-five percent of employees with access to a defined contribution
plan don’t contribute at all, and fewer than 10% contribute the maximum amount
allowed.
[6]
Naïve Diversification
Rules of thumb and mental shortcuts can cause problems with
portfolio diversification, particularly when one lacks knowledge about
investing. A common error is to use
simple allocation strategies that do not take risk/return preferences into
account. This includes the 1/n
strategy, where investors simply divide their money equally between all of the
fund options available.
[7]
This is an example of a more general diversification
heuristic, in which people make diversification decisions that are influenced
by the choices offered them. People’s
choices are contextual. That is, they
depend a great deal on the circumstances in which decisions are made.
Loss Aversion
Behavioral finance researchers have also found that people
don’t rate gains and losses equally.
People tend to accord losses about twice as much weight as gains; that
is, losses hurt substantially more than the pleasure that is obtained from a
comparable gain. Even people with
long-term investing horizons appear to be disproportionately concerned about
short-term losses. As a result, people
tend to invest using strategies that minimize loss rather than maximize wealth.
[8]
An extraordinary example comes from Harry Markowitz, the
grandfather of modern portfolio theory.
He once explained his own investment strategy:
"I should have computed the historical
covariances of the asset classes and drawn an efficient frontier. Instead, I visualized my grief if the stock
market went way up and I wasn’t in it – or if it went way down and I was
completely in it…so I split my contributions 50-50 between bonds and equities. I wanted to minimize my future regret."
[9]
Status Quo Bias
Plan participants tend to rebalance infrequently, even when
this results in lower overall returns.
For example, a study in 1987 found that the
median number of changes to TIAA-CREF portfolios over their lifetime
was
zero. A more recent analysis of TIAA-CREF plans also found that nearly
half of the participants never changed their allocation during a ten-year
period.
[10]
Why? Researchers
have several theories about the inertia that plan participants exhibit. One is fear of regret. Better not to make a decision than to make
an incorrect one. In the case of 401(k)
plans, we also have to acknowledge that most people lack the interest or the
knowledge to feel comfortable playing an active role in the investment
process. They choose to value other
ways of spending their time more than they value improving their investing
outcome.
The Disposition Effect
Finally, researchers have found that investors are averse to
selling assets at a lower price than the purchase price. Investors are more likely to sell funds that
have increased in value than they are likely to sell funds that have decreased
in value. This holds true even though
tax law favors selling securities at a loss.
This is not simply a matter of selling at the right time, because the winners
that were sold among the sample data subsequently performed better than the losers
that were kept.
[11] The issue of regret also plays a role here;
selling a security that has done poorly forces the investor to recognize that
loss.
Further, people evaluate prices by a process known as
“anchoring,” in which people’s quantitative estimates are disproportionately
based on recent prices. It can be hard
for individuals to acknowledge that the higher price is not the “real” price.
Plan Design and
Behavioral Finance
All of these errors in financial reasoning have consequences
for plan design, and investment professionals have become increasingly
thoughtful about how to better adapt plan features to accommodate human
behavior. A behavioral finance approach
generally emphasizes automatic and default features that work to circumvent the
inadequate saving tendencies of many plan participants. Recommended features include automatic
enrollment, automatic rebalancing, default investment options, and automatic
increases in deferral rates.
Automatic enrollment, which addresses problems of lack of self-control
and procrastination, has been quite successful in improving plan participation
rates. One program boosted
participation rates from 49% to 86%.
[12] Default options and automatic rebalancing tackle
the problems of inertia and insufficient financial knowledge.
Finally, automatic increases in deferral rates improve
inadequate savings levels from hyperbolic discounting. It is much easier to get people to agree to
future increases in savings rates than to get them to increase savings when the
money is actually in their pockets.
[13] In one study, automatic increases in
deferral rates increased savings levels by almost four times.
[14]
With these features, plan sponsors can create plans that
more closely match the needs of their participants.
Conclusion
Because financial decision-making errors are systematic, they
have to be taken seriously. It’s not
just that people don’t always behave rationally – we already knew that. Instead, what matters is that such
irrationality is both common and predictable.
Inadequate saving, insufficient or inappropriate diversification, and
emotional decision-making are all widespread behaviors among defined
contribution investors.
For anyone who cares about the future financial health of
defined-contribution plan participants, common behavioral errors should
influence how we think about plan design and oversight.
Automation and standardization of the investment process should
be the watchwords for plan design. As
much as possible, we want to provide effective guidelines for participants to help
remove emotion from decision making. As
investment professionals, we can make this process more streamlined and
straightforward by providing the tools and the guidance to help plan sponsors make
the right choices in plan design and execution.
[1] See Fuller,
Russell. 1998. “Behavioral Finance and the Sources of Alpha.” Journal of
Pension Plan Investing. Winter. Vol. 2, No. 3.
[2] See
Mullainathan, Sendhil and Richard Thaler. 2000. “Behavioral Economics.” NBER
Working Paper No. 7948. October.
[3]
See "John
Hancock's 2004 Survey of Defined Contribution Plan Participants."
[4]
Mullainathan, Sendhil and Richard Thaler. 2000. “Behavioral Economics.” NBER
Working Paper No. 7948. October.
[5]
Mullainathan, Sendhil and Richard Thaler. 2000. “Behavioral Economics.” NBER
Working Paper No. 7948. October.
[6] Munnell,
Alicia and Annika Sunden. 2004.
Coming up
Short: The Challenge of 401(k) Plans.
The Brookings Institution Press.
[7] See Bernartzi
and Thaler, 2001. “Naïve Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution
Saving Plans.”
The American Economic Review. March.
[8] See Thaler,
Richard. 1999. “The End of Behavioral Finance.”
Financial Analysts Journal. November/December.
[9] Cited in Stephen Schurr, “The Long Run: Pick
Up the Pieces of Your Asset Allocation Puzzle.” TheStreet.com. Found at: http://www.thestreet.com/_intuit/
funds/thelongrun/10071471_2.html.
[11] Odean,
Terrance. 1998. “Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?”
The Journal of Finance. Vol. LIII, No.
5. October.
[12] Thaler,
Richard and Shlomo Bernartzi. 2004. “Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee
Saving.”
Journal of Political Economy.
Vol. 112.
[13] Thaler,
Richard and Shlomo Bernartzi. 2004. “Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee
Saving.”
Journal of Political Economy.
Vol. 112.
[14] Thaler,
Richard and Shlomo Bernartzi. 2004. “Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee
Saving.”
Journal of Political Economy.
Vol. 112.
For more information about The McHenry Group, visit
www.mchenrygroup.com. Dr. Evans can be reached at (510) 595-2900 ext. 126 or via email at
rhonda.evans@mchenrygroup.com.